It is believed that good corporate governance practices assist significantly in uplifting corporate performance, and brings in business success and sustainability. This study aims to shed light on the impact of corporate governance practices on corporate sustainable growth in India. A sample size of leading 139 non-financial companies listed in NSE for five years has been used in this study. Using longitudinal data analysis, the findings of the study suggest that Board Size (BS) and the Board Independence (B-IND) exercise strong influence in explaining the Corporate Sustainable Growth in India after controlling the effect of Leverage (LEV).
Diyakini bahwa praktik tata kelola perusahaan yang baik sangat membantu dalam meningkatkan kinerja perusahaan, dan membawa keberhasilan dan keberlanjutan bisnis. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan dampak praktik tata kelola perusahaan pada pertumbuhan berkelanjutan perusahaan di India. Sebanyak (Pintea & Fulop, 2014) . The concept of corporate governance "encompasses policies, processes, and people, designed to govern the companies towards sustainable value generation." It is believed that corporate governance in its practical application is an important key that unlocks the true value of a business regardless of the firm size (Bates, 2013) .
The practice of good governance in a company mitigates risk, improves performance, opens the way to efficient financial markets, and establishes an attractive investment climate, showing transparency and social responsibility (Pintea & Fulop, 2014) .
On the other hand, sustainable growth is becoming more and more important for all the companies, across the globe. Strategically, 'value-creation' is the ultimate mission of all what we do. However, in today's global competitive battles, a mere maximizing growth may assist the company to accomplish its short-term goals but not the longrun objective what they seek to i.e., the 'valuecreation' (Ramezani et al., 2001) . Empirical shreds of evidence too, suggests that value creation maximizes around sustainable growth rate of an organization and decreases sharply, once actual growth exceeds sustainable growth rate (Ataünal et al., 2016) . Thus, realizing the empirical fact, (Klepczarek, 2017) . However, in common jargon, "corporate governance represents the system by which corporations are managed and controlled" (Van Horne & Wachowicz, 2015, pp. 8) . It defines the roles of the board of directors in managing the company and maintaining the relationship with the company's shareholders (Pass, 2004) . According to Shleifer & Vishny (1997) , "corporate governance is the process through which suppliers of finance to corporations gain assurance of return on their investment." While Blair (1995) 
Agency Theory
Agency theory is considered as one of the dominant theoretical perspectives in the literature on corporate governance (Daily et al., 2003) . The key tenet of this theory is the separation of ownership and control (Pandey, 2015, pp. 849) . Agency theory discusses situations, in which principals delegate their authority of control and decision-making for particular task to the agents (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ross, 1973) and given the chance, agents in most of the cases behave in a self-interested manner, behaviour that may conflict with the principal's interest (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . As such, principals enact structural mechanisms that keep an eye on the agent to curb opportunistic behaviour and better align the parties' interest (Madison, 2014; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983 ).
In sum, this theory specifies mechanisms which reduces agency loss (Eisenhardt, 1989) and suggests that agency problems are created, and agency costs are incurred to alleviate these problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) .
Stewardship Theory
The stewardship theory presents a divergent perspective than the agency theory, especially in terms of motivation and control issues of businesses. The key tenet of this theory is trust (Keay, 2017; Kluvers & Tippet, 2011; Hernandez, 2007) . Stewardship theory views manager as stewards (Pandey, 2015, pp. 849 ) and presumes that they will behave as trustworthy stewards of the organization and focus on the collective well-being of the constituents in the firm regardless of the managers' self-interests (Wesley, 2010; Donaldson & Davis, 1991) .
Putting things together, this theory emphasizes on cooperation and collaboration, and assumes that the manager will act for the collective interest to maximize the value of the firm.
Stakeholder Theory
The stakeholder theory is merely an extension of the agency view (Amer, 2016) . This theory assumes that the "companies and society are independent and therefore the corporation serves a broader social purpose than its responsibilities to shareholders" (Keil & Nicholson, 2003a) . To be more specific, the stakeholder theory is principally based on the premises that a firm's board of directors should be working in the best interests of all its stakeholders, rather than only the shareholders. "Stakeholder represents any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (Freeman, 1984) . This group includes -investors, managers, employees, customers, business partners, local communities, civil society and the natural environment (Wheeler & Sillanpaa, 1997) . Freeman et al., (2004) suggest that corporate managers should try to create as much as value for stakeholders as possible by resolving existing conflicts among them so that the stakeholders do not exit the deal.
In sum, this theory aims to ensure that the interests of the stakeholders are aligned with that of shareholders (Pandey, 2015, pp. 850) .
Resource Dependence Theory
The 'Resource Dependence Theory' is developed by the American theorists, Jeffrey Pferrer and Gerald Salancik, in the year 1978, in which the board of directors is considered as a resource that can, not only supplant its need for other resources, but also influence the environment in its favour, and thereby improve firm performance (Bathula, 2008) . The underlying proposition of this theory represents the need for environmental linkages between the firm and outside directors (Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012) .
Accordingly, the board of directors is considered as a link between the firm and the key resources (i.e., information, skills, access to constituents, and legitimacy) that a firm needs from the external environment for better performance and growth.
Putting things together, this theory perceives "the board members, with their knowledge, skills, talents, and professional experience, may be helpful in providing advice and counselling to management in case of limited or lack of inside knowledge. In addition, they could also provide the firm with access to scarce resources by providing the firm with access to their networks" (Sarens & Merendino, 2016) .
Corporate Sustainable Growth
The words "Sustainable Growth" do not have a rigid definition. It holds different meanings to different people and groups. However, from a financial perspective, sustainable growth implies "an affordable growth that can be sustained profitably for future benefits." The concept of corporate sustainable growth became popularized by Higgins
in the year 1977, where he first proposed the use of sustainable growth rate model in explaining the practical limit for growing firms. The model of sustainable growth rate explicates "whether or not the firm's proposed growth plan can be funded within its existing financial parameters" (Firer, 1995) . More specifically, sustainable growth rate seeks to explain "the utmost annualized growths in the percentage of sales a firm can afford without issuing any further (i.e. new) equity or, altering its financial policies."
Board Size and Corporate Sustainable Growth
Board size reflects the number of directors representing the board. It is considered to be one of the crucial factors to decide the efficiency and decision-making process of a firm (Nazar and Rahim, 2015) . However, identifying an appropriate board size has remained a matter of continuing debates (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Yermack, 1996; Jensen, 1993) . Jensen (1993) believes as boards become larger, they become less effective and are easier for the CEO to exert his or her control.
In addition, over-crowded boards are less cohesive (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) , and more difficult to coordinate (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) , which possibly can deteriorate the firm's performance.
A numerous number of prior studies (Orozco et al., 2018; Zabri et al., 2016; Ali, 2016; Azeez, 2015; Nazar and Rahim, 2015; Canh et al., 2014; Arosa et al., 2013; Jensen, 2012; Gill & Mathur, 2011; Guest, 2009; Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008; Singh & Davidson, 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Vafeas, 1999; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996; Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) 
CEO's Duality and Corporate Sustainable Growth
CEO's duality is considered to be an important mechanism of board control structure (Bathula, 2008) . It is argued when a single individual plays the role of a chairman and the CEO simultaneously, a conflict of interest and higher agency costs arises (Ehikioya, 2009 ). In addition, such a centralized leadership authority may lead to management's domination of the board, which results in poor performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983) . The prior empirical evidences (Wanjiru, 2013; Azeez, 2015) (Kamardin, 2011) , and their presence on the board gives greater weight to board`s deliberations and judgment (Heravia et al., 2011) . It is widely acknowledged that the ideal board should have a large proportion of outside directors as they bring in a balance of power into the 'upper echelons' of organizations (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) . Prior empirical evidence (Laing and Li, 1999; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Rouf, 2012; Khan and Awan, 2012; Chen, 2015; Liu et al., 2015; Sarpong-Danquah et al., 2018) suggests that the firm's having higher board independence likely to perform better. In sum, independent directors play an imperative role in protecting the shareholder interest (Byrd & Hickman, 1992) . Their effective monitoring reduces agency costs and boosts company performance (Fama, 1980) . Thus, we hypothesize: 
Presence of Family Affiliation on the Board and

Corporate Sustainable Growth
Strong family involvement on the board may blur the dissection between a family perspective and its responsibility to other shareholders produced on account of nepotism (Lansberg et al., 1988; Burkart et al., 2003; Pérez-González, 2006 ) and asymmetric altruism (Schulze et al., 2001) . In addition, large family shareholders may use their controlling position in the firm to extract private benefits at the expense of the small shareholders which may have an adverse effect on the firm's performance (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) . Thus, we hypothesize:
H6: Presence of Family Affiliation on the Board (P-FAMA) have a negative impact on attaining corporate sustainable growth.
METHODS
Database
Primarily Horne's SGR model has been used as there is no significant difference between these two models (Fonseka, Ramos, and Tian, 2012) .
Eq [Van Horne & Wachowicz, 2015, pp.192] = ROE x b 1 -(ROE x b) [Ross et al., 2012, pp.104-106] Total number of directors on the board at period t [Akpan & Arman, 2014; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Yasser, 2012; Nielsen & Huse, 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2009] [Berardino, 2016; Cabrera-Suárez & Martín-Santana, 2015; Liu et al., 2015; Azeez, 2015; Arosa et al., 2013] Total number of directors on the board during period t Akpan & Arman, 2014] f) Presence of Family Affiliation on the Board (P-FAMA) P-FAMA = Coded '1', if two or more family members on the Board during period t with same last name and Coded '0', otherwise [Rutherford et al., 2006; Schulze et al., 2001] 3. Control Variable: a) Leverage (LEV) LEV = Long t erm debt Total Equity [Mukherjee & Sen, 2018; ] Source: Author's own tabulation The models are represented as follows: But if the computed value of LM is significant, then H 0 will be rejected, and there will be random effects.
Step 2: Selection of fixed effects or random effects:
Hausman Test
To decide between fixed or random effects, we have to run a Hausman Test, where, as the null hypothesis represents, there are no fixed effects. Now, if the H statistics is significant, then H 0 is rejected, and fixed effect model is retained and vice-versa. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
